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The Environing Air: 
A Meditation on Communications Structures 
in Natural Environments 
 
Judy Spark 
 
The hill is shrouded with a dense, smirry rain. Arriving at the car park 300 metres 
up, I can hardly believe my eyes; it’s as if things from space have landed. There are 
three structures of ascending size, a “family” so to speak, and one of them looks 
like nothing I have ever seen before. 
Three display boards face the towers, so I am hopeful of an explanation. However, 
it turns out that these describe the flora and fauna of the hill itself as if, by drawing 
attention to the nesting habits of local Curlew or Red grouse, the enormous 
looming presence in the foreground might be overlooked. 
 
 
The growth of communications technology and data transmission systems make masts, 
antennae, and radar type installations, sometimes of significant scale like the one described 
above at the Lomond Hills in Fife, Scotland, a common and more or less accepted part of even 
the most remote landscape. Though concerns for the aesthetic impacts of such paraphernalia are 
sometimes voiced amongst hill-walkers, the possibility that the presence of such technology 
impairs the experience of temporarily being free from the noise of the contemporary human 
world is harder to argue. What is particularly intriguing however, and perhaps in relation to the 
former point, is just how little meaningful debate arises as a result of the positioning of certain 
technologies in natural environments, and as is the case at the Lomonds, making them the focus 
of our attention is in no way encouraged. 
Nevertheless, telecommunications installations of all varieties, particularly when 
contrasted with the surroundings of a natural landscape, invite us to think beyond the visible; to 
consider the relationship between the human and the natural realms, and the phenomena that 
envelop the two. For the purposes of this paper, I intend to put the debate relating to the potential 
health impacts of electromagnetic technologies momentarily to one side in order to explore the 
ground, beyond the obvious visual impacts, of the accoutrements of mobile communications 
systems. 
With regard to the methods employed in constructing this essay, I have made much use of 
first person experiential accounts through which I have tried to allow the poetry of the original 
experience to materialise1 and as an invitation to readers to build their own picture. These 
accounts make their appearance in italics throughout the text, in most cases at the beginning of 
each section. I have also drawn upon Anthony J. Steinbock’s outline of a phenomenological 
approach that begins with the “facts” of the everyday world or “with the things as they are 
assumed in the everyday sciences” (see Steinbock 127-135). In this particular case, I have made 
some reference to basic concepts of physics. I have tried to work between these experiential and 
factual accounts in pursuit of the general direction of the inquiry, drawing especially on the 
existentialism of Martin Heidegger as the binding that interweaves between the two positions. 
Sections I and II of the paper deal with the visual impact of communications structures 
before going on to attempt a reading of them through the Heideggerian concept of disclosure. 
Section III focuses on the “nature” of electromagnetic signals, drawing upon scientific concepts 
as a way to help recognise that nature. In Section IV the technological nature of contemporary 
human engagement with the world will be considered; a comportment towards things that 
Heidegger terms Ge-stell. At this point I will attend to some criticisms to the effect that 
Heidegger may not be the best philosopher to employ for the purposes of this meditation. Section 
V, the concluding section of the essay, in fact draws no definite conclusions but instead hints that 
a tentative acceptance of the uncertainty surrounding these technologies may be the best way to 
begin to come to terms with our shifting relationship with them, and might even cause us to 
reflect more fully on our technological attunement to the world. 
Doubtless implicit at the centre of this deliberation are the philosophical questions 
relating to how we use and manage such technologies and, though it is not my primary focus to 
describe the experience of using them, the description that I do intend to embark upon, that of 
being near the paraphernalia associated with the reception and transmission of radio signals in a 
natural environment, I hope may indirectly contribute to the wider debate surrounding the 
implications of communications technologies for human beings so heavily dependent upon 
them.2 
 
I: A Visual Intrusion 
Stoer, Assynt, North-West Scotland, April 2011 
It has been a long journey here to this elemental place at the far north west of the 
land. Only the sounds of the birds, a light wind, and in the distance the sea, are to 
be heard. And over there (I noticed it as soon as we arrived) a squat structure 
perched up on a small hill at a distance above the road. It keeps drawing my 
attention. 
 
The positioning of masts near residential locations is far less strongly contested by the 
public as was once the case, when indeed the mast is visible, and when it is, concerns are usually 
related to perceived health risks.3 In rural or more “natural” environments, though there is often 
ambiguity about the purpose of an installation which can sometimes give rise to concerns about 
the power levels involved, in general terms, any officially formulated complaints there tend to 
centre on the aesthetic impact upon the landscape.4 Frequently however, responses to 
telecommunications installations in natural environments are rather flat, almost verging on the 
pretence that they are not there. Sometimes these objects are disguised; in cities, concealed 
within church towers or lamp posts, and in rural locations (badly) as trees. The danger in viewing 
the mast predominately as an intrusion is that it becomes more likely that it will be dealt with by 
removing it from view.5 However, any serious analysis of technological placements in the 
landscape must necessarily reach beyond the visual, since the mast alters the character of a place 
in other ways: the phenomenon of the perpetual electromagnetic signal has the power to impair, 
or enhance, depending on personal opinion, the experience of being in a natural landscape. If 
such objects are allowed simply to vanish, with them disappears the initial means through which 
we may begin to negotiate our rather conflicted relationships with the technologies that form 
such a part of our existence. 
 
II: Disclosure of World 
Stoer, Assynt, North-West Scotland, April 2011 
The thing is placed in such a way that it’s obscured by the slope of the hill the 
closer one gets to it; its very elusiveness seems to make it more intriguing. I head 
out early in the evening when there is a feisty wind; it’s cold but bright, with fast 
moving clouds. I can see the structure sitting on the hilltop, which I hope to reach 
by sunset, but as I arrive at the part of the road that is directly underneath it, it has 
again disappeared from view. 
 
The path, which is not barred by a gate, is stony and the surrounding ground rough 
and tussocky. As I climb, the tip of the metal framework begins to appear; it’s 
shaped like a chunky pencil in wireframe, quite wide, with a point at the top. Then 
the metal-roofed shed-like building in front of it emerges and alternately appears 
and disappears with the undulations of the landscape as I move, so that the 
wireframe appears sometimes to protrude strangely from directly out of the rock 
and then seems to perch atop the level, grey, corrugated roof. I can see five drums 
of different sizes attached to the frame with their flat surfaces facing outwards, 
though apart from the one facing me, the white surface of which is catching the 
light, it’s difficult to tell in which direction exactly each of these point.  
 
I am aware that this object depends upon the phenomenon of electromagnetism, 
within that part of the electromagnetic spectrum that is comprised of “radio 
waves.” However, since I cannot see this part of the spectrum, as I can the part 
comprised of “light waves,” this information is of limited use towards gaining a 
fuller appraisal of what is in front of me.  
 
My eye follows grey plastic covered wires winding along the struts and crossbars 
of the structure and along metal ducting, to disappear into a grey steel box. I take 
in the way that each metal leg of the thing is “earthed” to the ground against a 
lightning strike, aware of the gathered potential power that I am next to. I sit on 
with this presence. 
 
Heidegger explains how it is that we can be aware of the world through a piece of 
equipment; such as the hammer he shows us in Being and Time in 1926. By its appearance, its 
weight, how it feels in the hand, the hammer speaks of hammering. It is an object so fit for 
purpose that it does not get in the way of our focus on the task in hand, that of hammering 
(Heidegger, Being and Time 99). Our concern then lies with the work, rather than the tool 
because it withdraws as it is encountered within the referential totality the work bears; through 
this totality the world announces itself to us (99; 105). “Readiness-to-hand” (Zuhandenheit) is 
the mode of Being that Heidegger assigns to such equipment; we are aware of the being of the 
world through the worldly characteristics of the object (99; 102). It is possible to see how the 
phone mast or communications tower conforms to this in some ways; its situation high up on a 
hill creating a relationship with the sky, the absence of any physical objects in the space around 
its higher points, the orientation of those points, drums, bars or wire aerials attached to it, all 
seem to allude to the immateriality of what may be taking place around it. In fact, it is hard to 
associate the structure with any purpose other than communication.6 It has the look then of being 
fit for purpose but it is still a problematic object in the sense that it is difficult to work out the 
exact variety of that purpose, and in this respect the thing can sometimes seem to take on sinister 
aspects.7 In addition, I myself have no natural wave awareness; I need to be in possession of 
another piece of equipment, a mobile phone handset connected to the appropriate network, for 
there to be even a possibility that I might make use of this installation. Certainly the structure 
itself, and even the handset, withdraws as we speak to a friend or listen to a broadcast, but we are 
not brought in closer proximity to the world by way of the object. In fact, apart from the content 
of the conversation in which I am engaging, it may have the opposite effect by contributing to 
the closing off of the world to our concern. It is only if the signal fades, is cut, or if there is 
interference, that the equipment begs any consideration at all. We may then question the 
origination of the signal, the weather conditions, or what lies between us and the place the signal 
may be travelling from that might be blocking it, for instance the walls of the tunnel that the train 
I am on is passing through. What is happening through this process of “malfunction,” Heidegger 
concludes, is that ready-to-hand equipment is made conspicuous by the fact that it has lost its 
readiness-to-hand and has attained the property of “un-readiness-to-hand” or presence-to-hand 
(Vorhandenheit); the thing is present as equipment but it is un-useable (102), something humans 
find very frustrating. Heidegger assigns missing equipment to this category also; the hammer is 
nowhere to be found when it is required (103). I can apply this to the occasions on which my 
phone “loses” the signal, or there is no signal (it is “missing”) because one does not exist at the 
place where I am standing: there is no handy mast. 
When in the midst of a natural, possibly remote, landscape, my concern will most likely 
lie with the qualities of the landscape itself and what it is like to be there. I am an experienced 
hill-walker and I sometimes just want to be on my own with only the landscape for company, to 
go for a walk just for the sake of walking and to hear nothing but the breeze, water, birds or 
other, perhaps unidentifiable, sounds that make up a place that is not teeming with human 
activity. If I come upon a mast at this time, the equipment seems not to belong there. Unless I 
have need of it at this particular moment, it does not fit with my mindset and simply creates 
disturbance by standing in the way of my primary concern. I may feel annoyed, or I may try to 
ignore that part of what is in front of me. Equipment that is ready-to-hand therefore always also 
harbours the possibility of being present-to-hand; the two overlap, and are dependent upon one 
another (101). This overlap is unfixed and equipment can change state at any time; the 
environment that I am in may become inhospitable, or worse, my walking partner or I may suffer 
an injury severe enough to warrant calling for assistance. At such times I may hope fervently for 
access to the spectrum even if one of us has to walk some distance to locate it, and once 
connected, the equipment, both handset and mast, withdraws again to become part of the 
referential totality of securing help. In this way the mast holds the potential of disclosing the 
previously unseen world of warmth, support, comfort, safety, and healing. So, though I may long 
to separate myself for a while from the clamour of human society by setting forth out onto the 
hills, where I might once have done this with little thought other than that required in the way of 
common “hill sense,” I now must make a further consideration: whether to remain connected 
while I am gone, by way of my mobile phone. I do not expect to encounter trouble, but I am 
acutely aware of how quickly weather conditions on the hills can change to make progress across 
their summits potentially perilous.8 
The ways in which the mast harbours the qualities of both readiness-to-hand and 
presence-to-hand seem quite clear then, but in terms of disclosing the world to us in any way 
akin to the sense that Heidegger meant, it appears that the structure fails. Indeed it is difficult to 
see anything of the environing nature of the mast in the way, to quote two of Heidegger’s 
examples, that a covered railway platform correlates with bad weather, or lighting accounts for 
the absence of daylight (100). The materials of the structure may seem somehow to fit with the 
changeable Scottish weather; its light reflecting steel; its whites and greys against the colours of 
the sky, clouds and water, but this at most complements the thing’s natural surroundings. The 
mast itself fails to appear to as any sort of “extension of the natural world” (Picon 66), seeming 
only to furnish a connection with the human world from which we have been attempting to 
temporarily retreat. The peace of mind that may come about at the sight of the equipment in 
relation to a possible accident, is gained at a cost; the disturbance of both my opportunity to 
experience fully my natural environing, and my sense of solitude. 
 
III: The Environing Air 
Stoer, Assynt, North-West Scotland, April 2011 
 
As I get closer, the mast still eludes my perceptual grasp; I somehow find myself 
even further beneath it, so that its squatness appears to be getting taller. With every 
step, I need to bend my head back further to see the top. I reach its foot and try to 
register all its physical features. What is most striking, however, is that as I step 
around the side of the equipment building, the sound of the wind is immediately cut, 
and all that remains in the stillness around me is the sound it makes as it plays in 
and around the structure. It occurs to me that the timbre and variations of this 
sound are quite unique, dependent as they are on the speed, strength and direction 
of the wind, the form of the construction, and my sheltered position. I notice the 
sounds change as I move my head. It is only when the wind subsides momentarily, 
that I become aware of a low electrical hum. 
 
On account of the wind, and the clouds behind and above the structure, everything 
appears to be moving, restless. The sun, low in the sky now and blinding to look 
into, plays off the structure casting its shadow onto the gneissy moorland and the 
image shimmers as the grass beneath it is tousled by the wind and the sun moves on 
its course. There is a marked contrast between the fixity of the steel construction 
and the restlessness around it. The movement, and of course the sound, seems to 
speak of the energy that the mast gathers and transmits, of natural phenomena 
harnessed, directed, redirected, while the mast itself remains rooted to the ground, 
set in its concrete platform laid square into the moor and beginning to take on the 
colours and crumbled edges of the ancient rock surfaces around it. Strangely, for 
an item of contemporary technology, it appears to own an aura of permanence, 
solidity and dependability in contrast to its vague functionality; the shrieking, 
whistling sounds, making its resistance to the wind audible, carry echoes of those 
stronger than this that it must previously have endured. There is the impression that 
the pulsed signals must be wrested from the teeth of this wind before they are sent 
on their way. 
 
Of course not all technologically generated electromagnetic activity is mapped, but a 
survey of the UK coverage maps of the major domestic mobile phone network operators, 
discounting radio broadcasts and emergency or military transmissions, shows that few “holes” 
are apparent.9 On even the calmest of days, present upon the apparently still environing air, are 
likely to be a confusion of pulsing electromagnetic fields operating at various frequencies. 
The Earth has its own natural magnetic field that I can “see” with a compass, which is 
part of the protective system of the planet, and many other natural oscillating atmospheric 
electromagnetic fields, of varying intensities, are present around us all the time (see Warnke 7). 
The interconnectedness of these naturally occurring fields, which are very much weaker than 
those that are technologically produced, and the biological processes of life on this planet, is well 
established10 and it is for this reason that concerns about the impact of artificially generated 
electrical and magnetic fields has arisen (see Warnke 11). The presence of such fields, those that 
emanate from a mast for instance, or around the electrical wiring of a house, can also be detected 
by way of a compass, the needle of which tends to deflect to a point perpendicular to the 
direction of the current; and of course our televisions, radios and mobile phones all generate their 
own electromagnetic fields. 
Since, as the mast has shown, any encounter with nature through contemporary 
technologies is made more difficult by the invisibility of the phenomena involved, I will 
momentarily, make recourse to some of the scientific facts. The most incredible aspects of radio 
transmission lie in its relationship to natural phenomena. When I speak, the reason that the sound 
reaches the ears of another person and is heard, is because the sound’s vibrations are carried on 
the air. When my upstairs neighbour thumps across his floor, his footfall can be felt by placing 
my hand on the wall of the room beneath. If I whisk my arm in front of me through the air, I feel 
resistance, so clearly something, rather than nothing, is there. That this something, like the bricks 
and mortar of the wall, may be comprised of atoms need not prefigure my understanding of the 
fact that the transmission of sound occurs as a result of the transference of vibrations through a 
medium, be it air, bricks, or other media. Indeed, although by way of a different kind of 
vibration, electromagnetic waves can be used to make sound manifest as if through the air. Even 
a very basic explanation of radio transmission can open up something that, in marked contrast to 
the times of its discovery, is very often in the present day taken for granted: such an explanation 
follows. 
The act of signalling by radio, for broadcasting or telecommunications, relies upon the 
transference of vibrations via an electromagnetic field: causing the movement of a large group of 
electrons in one place (the transmitting aerial) so that they have a detectable effect on electrons 
in another place (the receiving aerial) (Sinclair 2). Such transmissions occur by subjecting 
electrons, the smallest and lightest subatomic particles, to an electrical current that is constantly 
changing, pushing them in, and then out, of an aerial in a repeated cycle. This pulsing activity 
results in the creation of the electromagnetic field that carries the transmission, and the number 
of completed cycles that takes place each second is what is known as the “frequency” of the 
transmission, which is commonly measured in megahertz (5). The principle in operation for both 
listening to a radio programme or for mobile data transmission, including that of my friend’s 
voice over my mobile telephone, is the same, except that different transmission frequencies are 
used. 
Radio transmissions depend upon natural phenomena. As previously stated, the most 
incredible aspects of radio transmission lie in its relationship to natural phenomena, but we 
completely fail to notice this fact as we engage with our personal paraphernalia. Indeed, we fail 
to see the equipment at all, unless it shifts from being ready, to merely being present, to hand, if 
it stops working, in other words. 
 
IV: A Natural World Enframed 
We encountered the two terms of ready to hand (Zuhandenheit) and present to hand 
(Vorhandenheit) earlier, standing in Heidegger’s workshop, considering the hammer. We began 
to see then that there could be more to technology than we might at first have assumed. Nearly 
thirty years on, in his 1954 essay, “The Question Concerning Technology,” Heidegger develops 
the notions of Zuhandenheit and Vorhandenheit further in order to address what he sees as the 
fundamentally different phenomenon of modern technology. To see what it is that is different 
about it, we need to question beyond our general assumption as to what technology is. This 
assumption, simply put, might be that we employ technology to make stuff. We make material 
objects, we make power, we make the means by which we physically move from one place to 
another, and the means to communicate over distance in real time, in words, and in pictures. All 
manufacturing, by hand as in earlier times, or by machine or power plant via modern 
technologies is, Heidegger contends, “a means to an end” (Heidegger “The Question Concerning 
Technology” 5). However, this is only to state “the instrumental and anthropological definition 
of technology” (5) and, though accurate, it doesn’t take us any closer to its essence (6).11 Its 
essence has less to do with what it is (i.e., a means to an end) than with what it means. In the 
encounter with the hammer, if we remember, Heidegger takes us beyond the thing as an object, 
to a point where the world is opened to us by way of the task in which we employ it. In “The 
Question Concerning Technology,” he goes on to link the activity of making to the Greek term 
of technē; making things is a human activity in the course of which a process is undertaken by a 
craftsman to bring something into existence: a house, a ship, a chalice, from a material that the 
maker knows and has come to understand (13). This way of “bringing something forth” is not, 
however, simply the manufacturing of a thing but is a sort of revealing: of the material, the 
maker’s engagement with it, and the world to which they both belong, and it amounts to a sort of 
poetry (poiēsis) (10). It is this capacity of revealing that is the important aspect of technology. 
But modern technology reveals the world differently from such earlier modes of production: it 
doesn’t just reveal more; it reveals in a dramatically different way. This revealing “challenges” 
the earth to supply energy that we can extract and store for use later in making the things that we 
want. The processes of modern technologies then, are not the technē of poiēsis in the way that 
were earlier means to ends. 
This setting-upon that challenges forth the energies of nature is an expediting 
[Fördern], and in two ways. It expedites in that it unlocks and exposes. Yet that 
expediting is always itself directed from the beginning toward furthering something 
else, i.e., toward driving on to the maximum yield at the minimum expense. (15) 
 
So the distinction to be drawn between older and newer technologies is not to do with the 
paraphernalia of the technologies themselves; though “a radar station is of course less simple 
than a weather vane” they are still both means that meet ends (5). The difference, rather, lies in 
the way that we have come to view the world and its natural processes; as resources, there to be 
uncovered, extracted, challenged to meet our increasing “needs” and desires. Thus, to quote 
Heidegger’s example, we see a fast flowing river as a source of hydropower, the essence here 
tied to the idea of the power plant, not the river (16).12 In addition, we don’t just take or make 
only what we need at the time, but we store up extracted power for later use, set it aside as 
“standing-reserve” (Bestand) (17). And we continue to do this, keeping an eye on “the maximum 
yield at the minimum expense” (15). Modern technology then, changes our relationship to 
nature; we no longer regard the earth and the things around us with awe and reverence but 
instead as a series of things to be brought under our control. This way of challenging the natural 
into standing-reserve is now less of a conscious choice than it is a disposition towards the world 
and, lacking the perspective to see what we are doing, we are part of the problem, stuck in the 
same pattern of what we have become, and unable to opt out of what we have brought about. It is 
not that technology is a force in itself that has us in its grip; rather, it is this pattern of what 
Heidegger refers to as Ge-stell or “enframing” that holds us fast and seemingly powerless (19).13 
However, this is not the worst of the situation; this way of ordering the world, through its 
“unlocking, transforming, storing, distributing, and switching about” (112) is a form of revealing 
that causes all the other potential ways that our world might reveal itself to us to recede, along 
with the possibility of our having any grasp of our part within that world (26). 
I am not unaware of the fact that there may be a tinge of irony, in an essay that has so 
much to do with this concept of enframing, in having leant so much on physical science as the 
underpinning of the foregoing section of this work, given that Heidegger holds the rise of the 
physical sciences as a major component in holding that enframing in place; it is the way that 
modern science represents nature that turns it into something orderable and measurable (21). 
Nevertheless, I hope that this will be seen to be a relevant part of constructing an approach to 
technology that takes into account both its “instrumental and anthropological” conception, which 
can hardly be separated from physical science, as well as the ways that Heidegger is encouraging 
us to attend to it.14 
I look up at the mast, considering its invisible field, the crossings and overlaps with 
other fields, and wonder what these would look like were I only able to see them, 
and if I were, would this furnish any better understanding of their ‘ordering’? My 
eyes and lungs perceive the air here to be so clear, but it seems that the very space 
above my head has itself become “standing-reserve.” 
 
I’d now like to turn to the concern that Heidegger’s approach does not help us to identify, 
and in fact may even obscure, which things in the world are technological and which not.15 I can 
deal with this point swiftly and simply by stating that Heidegger’s account of technology had to 
do with the way that we relate to technology and was never intended to help distinguish between 
it and nature. But this comment of course then begs the further question of whether anything 
exists at all in our world that is not technological, bearing in mind that the category of nature is 
itself a human category.16 My first response to this criticism was to wonder just how much of a 
distinction between these things is needed for my purposes here; as long as I am certain that a 
mobile phone mast (as well as other antennae) is a piece of man-made equipment that “unlocks, 
transforms, stores, distributes and switches about” natural phenomena, is further distinction 
needed? Well, yes, as things turn out; I suggested earlier that there are times when I “may long to 
separate myself for a while from the clamour of human society by setting forth out onto the 
hills,” but is it possible for me to leave that human world behind, albeit temporarily, while there 
is even a shadow of an argument that for a hill-walker “a landscape could be said to be a piece of 
equipment”?17 Such a comment may seem extreme, but I think that it may be of unfolding 
importance and I’m certain it could form the subject of another paper. However, I will for the 
moment confine myself to brief comments. The definition of nature is of course one that 
fluctuates; there is no neat division between what is natural and what is not; it may well be 
subjective and the matter is only likely to increase in complexity. To answer this particular 
criticism within the context of this essay then, I intend simply to make recourse to the use of 
inverted commas around the word “nature” to denote the things we commonly understand as part 
of the natural world before we begin to dig deeper, and to contend that, however pervasive the 
argument of the equipmentisation of hills (one that is actually quite well served by the practice of 
Munro-bagging18) it is still the case for the vast majority of hill-walkers that the hills represent 
some form of retreat from day to day human concerns. I realise that even here there is still 
something of a flavour of instrumentalism, but I will leave it hanging there unsatisfactorily while 
I shift focus to the charge that we simply cannot leave behind our “technological attunements” 
when we “enter nature.”19 On this latter point I agree; what is clear, with relation to magnetic 
fields and radio transmission, is the ways in which the technology, made visible by way of its 
paraphernalia—the phone mast, the radio antenna—exists as part of both the natural and the 
human worlds, leading to “the inescapable co-mingling of these worlds.”20 It is essential that we 
recognise this co-mingling, and even if we cannot “leave our technological attunements behind,” 
to question where the boundaries might lie or at least where they might once have lain, in order 
that we understand the value and the extraordinariness of what is around us. Indeed, Heidegger 
wants to “awaken us into absolute fascination that things are as they are, that they even are at 
all,” both natural and man-made (O’Brien 4). The charge against Heidegger’s effectiveness in 
addressing this matter, the concern that his thinking in fact obscures for us what technology 
really is, can be countered by testing it out on the quasi objects of our everyday lives (see Picon 
11). The technologies that instrumentalise the phenomena of the electromagnetic wave, the 
harnessed power of the microwave frequencies that carry broadcasts, conversation or data, have 
already been brought about and the only thing to be done now is to approach these technologies 
and their attendant natural phenomena by letting them be, as if the combination of the natural 
and human that is the broadcast signal is an entity in itself. That it is vital that we do this is 
confirmed by the fact that, if we really think about it, everything around us today exists in this 
combination. For Heidegger, the nature of being human is not that we ourselves form entities but 
rather that we are Dasein; the clearing through which entities may disclose themselves (BT 27). 
The trouble is that we habitually disclose entities technologically, viewing them in the manner 
mentioned earlier, as standing-reserve, and perhaps this includes hills. It is all we know, our 
destiny, in fact. But Heidegger points us towards the possibility of a realignment of being which 
is not at odds with the way things are for us now. Even such an unlikely object as the phone mast 
then, perhaps particularly when contrasted against its location in a “natural” landscape, may 
present the opportunity for an expanded disclosure of our own technologically entwined being. 
Every time an electron moves, it has an effect on other electrons by bumping into them. 
Theoretically, each such movement has the power to affect “every other electron in the 
universe,” but there is such a degree of movement of electrons happening constantly in our 
universe, that such shifts are generally only detectable by those nearest to one another (Sinclair 
2). With the awareness of this potentiality nevertheless, we are reminded in the simplest of terms, 
that literally everything has an impact on everything else and that a reverent acknowledgement of 
this fact ought to form a central tenet of our existence on this planet. Such an acknowledgement 
might guard against the taking for granted of any of the natural elements of our world, which 
may mean that we again regard with wonder and appreciation the technological advancement 
that comes about through the disclosure of those elements, and would support a human 
comportment of care, ethical concern, and humility as primary motivations within what it is that 
we are doing when we push natural processes in order to yield power.21 For Heidegger, the very 
being of Dasein can be defined as care; to be human means to be concerned about the things and 
the people the world contains (see BT 235-244). 
It sometimes seems that technological development has taken on a life of its own, that it 
is unstoppable. Of course technology is not an independent force, but humanity could currently 
be described as being in its thrall; we are in the grip of Ge-stell, to the extent, as Heidegger has 
argued, that this has become the “defining characteristic” of what it is to be human (“QCT”) 
120). In current times, this is evident to many of us as we feel pulled along by the imperative that 
would have technology take care of all our needs and furnish all of our desires, even those we are 
not yet aware that we have. Indeed, it is always interesting to consider who, exactly, this “we” 
refers to, but in this context it throws into relief the aspect of unequal access to digital 
technologies that exists across our world. 
 
V: Anxious Times 
Stoer, Assynt, North-West Scotland, April 2011 
 
As I stand on at the foot of this thing, it almost seems to my wind whipped eyes, to 
vibrate, which of course parts of it do, though not visibly. I feel an uneasiness creep 
over me, a change of atmosphere that I have noticed in similar places before. I am 
not sure whether this is because the charged air can, after all, in some way, be 
sensed, or if it is simply that one is somewhere one really should not be; after all 
this thing might harbour danger, even though I’m on the outside of the gate that 
carries the alarming warning signs. Even though I know that it is ”permitted” to be 
here, it’s as if one oughtn’t to show any curiosity, which might be construed as 
suspicious behaviour, as if a pretence that the thing is not there is the correct 
comportment. Without doubt, proximity to such things brings about a sort of 
unseatedness, an anxiety. 
 
Aside from being a seemingly intrusive reminder of the human world, the mast seems 
bound up with things that appear beyond our control; such technologies seem limitless, it is 
difficult to ascertain where their edges are; they “leak” across boundaries (see Dunne and Raby 
18). Humans do not enjoy the discomfiture of anxiety, but we may have to accept that it 
accompanies the invisible clouds of electromagnetic presence that sustain the communications 
technologies we have made so central to our existence, and that it may indeed be a general facet 
of technologically bound contemporary life.22 
Maintaining a level of openness, enough to act as the clearing, through which entities 
may disclose themselves, is not second nature for most humans. We are more comfortable when 
we are filling the gaps with things and stuff and noise, that we might muffle the anxiety of the 
emptiness at the centre of our being. However, Heidegger maintains that this anxiousness itself 
can hold us open (see BT 228-235) in such a way that we are able to allow things to manifest 
themselves in ways “consistent with their own possibilities” (see Zimmerman) and not simply in 
terms of their instrumental value. If we are able to allow this form of manifestation, this, in turn, 
consolidates our openness as the clearing for such manifestations to continue to occur and 
deepen.23 We need then, to learn to pay closer attention to the things around us and perhaps 
especially to the things that we make, but we have to accept technology as it is now; there is no 
going back to some bygone age, when our relationship to it seemed simpler, by putting the genie 
back into the bottle (“QCT” 25-26).24 Heidegger encourages us to this acceptance; we accept 
technology in its instrumental sense, appreciating what it can do for us practically. At the same 
time, however, just like the earlier concepts of Zuhandenheit and Vorhandenheit, these two 
senses of technology are not exclusive of one another, rather they are co-dependent, and 
sometimes they may even overlap. Therefore, it is only by first paying full attention to 
technology in its instrumental sense that we can begin to move beyond this variety of revealing 
to reach its deeper meanings. To mount a struggle against, or regard as an enemy or the work of 
the devil, the contemporary tide of technological development in whose swell we find ourselves, 
will not help to solve the problems we face (see “QCT” 26). Nor should we, however, see it as 
neutral since, closed to its essence, we remain “unfree and chained” to it (4). 
It emerged earlier that we cannot really any longer separate the natural and the 
technological and indeed, it has been one of the main purposes of this phenomenology of 
communication structures to show the ways in which these pieces of equipment might encourage 
us to begin to reflect upon this fact of our being. I have reported my own first-hand accounts of 
such installations as they have been encountered in the natural landscape, and through 
Heidegger’s accounts of Zuhandenheit and Vorhandenheit, as well as his later articulations on 
nature as subjected to the ordering principles of Ge-stell, I have attempted to make some 
alignment between the utilitarian sense of this experience and the nature hidden within, or 
possibly obscured by, the scientific facts of the technology, even if by drawing, at least partially, 
on some of these very facts! 
I hope that by testing Heidegger’s thought towards these ends, I have shown the pursuit 
of this sort of understanding as being worthwhile in the attempts to disclose the fuller meanings 
of the world and its implications for our own human Being, and that in fact the agency of such 
attempts gains import for the contemporary human in the face of increasing technological 
dependency and uncertainty. Such understandings are even harder to reach, however, when the 
technology is characterised by invisibility, so the opportunities presented by visual cues need to 
be seized wherever they are still available.25 In terms of our relationship to technology, nothing 
is fixed and we are perhaps in the midst of anxious times. Randall Teal articulates Heidegger’s 
insights on anxiety in beautifully optimistic terms: 
it brings back our astonishment with things as they are … one’s hearing regains its 
acuity, and with renewed sensitivity, the individual becomes receptive to the 
shifting nature of a situation. With this experience, one is brought back into one’s 
own possibilities. As a result the “world” resonates again at its fullest. (18) 
 
 
 
Notes 
 
1 Any charge that these accounts verge too much on the “idiosyncratic” can be defended by 
reference to the endorsement of such descriptions as a valuable phenomenological starting point 
by David Seamon in “A Way of Seeing People and Place: Phenomenology in Environment-
 
 
2 A very small sampling of such reflection might include for instance; Albert Borgmann; 
Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life, Andrew Feenberg; Questioning 
Technology, or Paul Virilio; Polar Inertia.  
 
3 UK Mast Sanity campaign. Web. 12th March 2013. See also UK Mobile Telecommunications 
and Health Research. Telecommunications and Health Research Programme Report 2007. Web. 
12th March 2013. 
 
4 See especially the arguments of PLACE artworks and initiatives. Web. 12th March 2013. 
 
5 PLACE actively campaign for the “visual intrusions” of mobile phone installations to be 
minimised through “innovative mast designs.” Web. 12th March 2013. 
 
6 One difference between modern and contemporary or postmodern technology is that the latter 
category consists of what Antoine Picon refers to as “quasi-objects of terminals, connectors and 
networks” in “Anxious Landscapes” Grey Room 01 (73). 
 
7 In the UK, such installations may be labelled with the host operator’s name as well as a 
reference number, but mast sharing is encouraged and it is often impossible to discover what 
each individual piece of apparatus is for. 
 
8 By some twist of fate during the revision process of this paper, I had the uncomfortable 
opportunity of experiencing something akin to what I have been trying to articulate in this 
paragraph. On a walking trip to the remote area of Loch Ossian in Scotland, after a day on the 
hills in perfect conditions, I slipped on some ice at low level, breaking my wrist (though I was 
not aware of the full extent of the damage until my return home a couple of days later). Only 
myself and one other member of our party of seventeen, could obtain a mobile phone signal, via 
a mast located at the town of Fort William approximately 52 kilometres away. I became acutely 
aware of my dependency on this signal, as well as on the intermittent and very slow internet 
connection at the Loch Ossian Hostel warden’s office to disclose, in this location, the previously 
distant world of work, shifted deadlines, order, transport, and care that I needed to access in 
order to make the necessary arrangements for dealing with my daily life back home without, for 
an unspecified time, the use of my dominant hand. 
 
9 UK Mobile Coverage. Web. 12th March 2012. 
 
10 The ability of animals and birds to sense the earth’s magnetic field is known as 
magnetoception or magnetoreception and the possibility that humans may also be able to 
perceive this field is the subject of ongoing research; see “Magnetoreception and 
Electromagnetic Field Effects: Sensory Perception of the Geomagnetic Field in Animals and 
Humans” in Electromagnetic Fields: Biological Interactions and Mechanisms.  
 
11 I am grateful to one of my anonymous reviewers for suggesting that an earlier draft of this 
section might be expanded to address this distinction more fully. 
 
 
12 It is this notion in Heidegger’s thinking that makes its application to postmodern digital 
technologies so fitting; for instance, our knowledge of the properties of electromagnetism grew 
from the observable phenomena of magnetism, by way of the physical sciences. The 
electromagnetic fields that carry radio signals are not visible so, we only experience them in their 
instrumental sense, by listening to what is being carried upon them. The essence here then, is to 
do with the signal and not the phenomenon that carries the broadcast and allows it to be brought 
about in the first place. 
 
13 Heidegger moves the word “frame” on to become enframing. In this way he captures the sense 
of something that is looked through in order to get a certain view of something but also extends 
its meaning to articulate the way that humans are drawn or “called forth” into this way of 
ordering and viewing the world. 
 
14 I’m grateful to one of this paper’s anonymous PhaenEx reviewers for suggesting that I stress 
my deliberate use of these two conceptions of technology. 
 
15 This concern was raised by Chris Nagel in his commentary on the first version of this paper 
delivered at the workshop BTTTT! (University of Waterloo, May 2012). 
 
16 This notion that nothing in the world is natural or independent of human influence any longer 
is thoroughly explored, particularly with regard to climate, by Bill McKibben in The End of 
Nature. 
 
17 This claim is again indebted to Chris Nagel’s original commentary on the first version of this 
paper.  
 
 
18 In Scotland, mountains over 3000feet/914 metres are known as Munros, after Sir Hugh Munro 
who first listed them. “Munro bagging” refers to the aim some hill-walkers have of ascending as 
many of these as possible. 
 
19 I owe this insight to ongoing correspondence with Chris Nagel.  
 
20 Again, this thought is indebted to Chris Nagel’s commentary. 
 
21 On the possibility that wonder may have an ethical import see Ronald Hepburn, Wonder and 
Other Essays. 
 
22 With reference to this point, consider the pressure to keep up with technologies that we do not 
understand, the threat of cyber crimes against us, the awareness that terrorism somehow thrives 
on the use of digital technologies (though of course we may not fully understand in what ways) 
or the fear of new developments in bio-technology, to name but a few examples. 
 
 
23 The concepts under discussion here clearly illustrate Heidegger’s interest in certain strands of 
Buddhism, an interest that is well documented. See particularly Michael E. Zimmerman and 
Simon P. James. 
 
24 Heidegger is sometimes charged with romanticising rural life of the past and the ways of the 
peasants of the land but he does not want us to hark back to the past, or regard technology as 
something we should fight; rather his hope is that we find a way to live in acceptance with it, 
understanding it for what it is so that we are not chained to it. 
 
25 I am grateful to one of this paper’s anonymous PhaenEx reviewers for raising the question of 
whether telecommunications equipment disguised as for instance, trees or lamp-posts, or 
concealed within church towers, disclose differently. In response to this I’d say that it’s certain 
that they do, though I will have to leave a fuller analysis of the reasons why this is to the subject 
of another paper. 
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